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What’s Law Good For? An 
Empirical Overview of Charter 
Equality Rights Decisions 
Bruce Ryder, Cidalia C. Faria and Emily Lawrence∗  
“…the [similarly situated] test cannot be accepted as a fixed rule or 
formula for the resolution of equality questions arising under the Charter.” 
-McIntyre J. in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia1 
It has now been 15 years since the Supreme Court first outlined, in 
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, an approach to the inter-
pretation of the equality rights in section 15 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms,2 and five years since the Court revised the test for determin-
ing violations of section 15 in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment 
and Immigration).3 It has become a cliché to note that the definition of 
equality rights is the most challenging and elusive task imposed on the 
judiciary by the Charter. Equality has long been the subject of ideologi-
cally charged debates featuring widely divergent theories. Since phi-
losophers have debated the meaning of equality for millennia, it should 
hardly be surprising that the Canadian courts have had difficulty settling 
on a single approach to equality rights since they came into force in 
1985 — or if the generality of the approaches on which they have 
agreed can serve to obscure fundamental differences.  
                                                                                                                                
∗   Bruce Ryder, Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University; Ci-
dalia C. Faria, Assistant Crown Attorney, Ministry of the Attorney General, Ontario, and 
LL.M. in Constitutional Law 2001, Osgoode Hall Law School; Emily Lawrence, LL.B. 
student, Class of 2005, Osgoode Hall Law School. The views expressed here are the authors’ 
and not those of the Ministry of the Attorney General. 
1  Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, at 168, [1989] 
S.C.J. No. 6. 
2  Being Schedule I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
3  [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, [1999] S.C.J. No. 12. 
104  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
 
The potential breadth of equality rights raises the interpretive stakes 
compared to the more focused application of most other Charter rights 
and freedoms. In a society characterized by persistent inequalities, the 
judiciary could enlist section 15 in the redistribution of a wide range of 
legal and material entitlements. Section 15 thus implicates, in a particu-
larly profound manner, the appropriate division of responsibility be-
tween courts and legislatures in a constitutional democracy. Perhaps this 
helps explain both the courts’ cautious approach to the adjudication of 
equality claims and the intemperate nature of much of the academic 
commentary on their equality decisions — high expectations or political 
anxieties meet judicial realpolitik. We should approach the task of seek-
ing section 15’s meanings with a humility that befits the size of the 
challenge. As the Supreme Court has noted, there are no fixed or easy 
formulas to the definition of equality. 
This paper begins, in Part I, by outlining the tension between formal 
and substantive understandings of equality that characterizes section 15 
jurisprudence. While both visions have informed the interpretation of 
section 15, and often work harmoniously in resolving equality issues, 
we are concerned that the Court has not consistently adhered to its stated 
commitment to favouring substantive equality over formal equality 
when the two visions clash. In Part II, we review academic assessments 
of the Supreme Court’s approach to section 15 and its record in equality 
rights litigation. While some of the commentators share our concern that 
the Court’s recent jurisprudence is compromising its commitment to 
substantive equality, others express the view that the Court has consis-
tently favoured the claims and perspectives of equality-seeking groups. 
In Part III, we attempt to shed some light on these varying assessments 
by examining the record of Supreme Court and lower court decisions in 
adjudicating section 15 claims over the past 15 years. We found that the 
success rate of equality claimants has been consistently and significantly 
lower than the success rate of Charter claimants generally, although the 
success rate has increased in the past five years. In Part IV, we examine 
how the Supreme Court has applied the four contextual factors set out in 
Law to guide the determination of whether differences in treatment on 
prohibited grounds violate human dignity and thus amount to discrimi-
nation in a substantive sense. Of these four factors, we found that the 
“correspondence” factor, which restates the similarly situated test re-
jected as a guide to section 15 in Andrews, has functioned as the deter-
minative factor in the Court’s equality decisions since Law. Finally, in 
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Part V, we discuss the need to reconsider the application of the four 
contextual factors in Law so that the promotion of substantive equality 
is consistently treated as the primary goal of equality jurisprudence. We 
argue that violations of section 15 should be found whenever govern-
ments impose differential treatment on the basis of a prohibited ground 
that has the effect of further subordinating an already disadvantaged 
group, unless the law or policy at issue is a targeted program that ame-
liorates the condition of a more or equally disadvantaged group. 
I. THE TENSION BETWEEN FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE 
UNDERSTANDINGS OF EQUALITY 
In resolving the challenges posed by section 15 of the Charter, the 
courts have drawn significant guidance from anti-discrimination juris-
prudence developed under Canadian human rights statutes, from the 
experience of other nations and from international law. Relying on these 
sources and the text of section 15, the courts have concluded that section 
15 does not posit a general guarantee of legal equality that can be used 
to challenge any legal differences in treatment. Section 15 is concerned, 
rather, only with those legal inequalities imposed on the basis of the 
most pernicious and persistent disadvantages associated with the per-
sonal characteristics listed as prohibited grounds of discrimination (or 
analogous thereto). In addition, the courts have had no difficulty con-
cluding that section 15 is concerned with discrimination that can be 
either intentional or inadvertent, direct (resulting from a classification 
on a prohibited ground that is evident on the face of a law or policy) or 
indirect (resulting from the effects of the application of a facially-neutral 
law or policy). Nevertheless, fundamental differences about the meaning 
of equality rights permeate the Canadian constitutional jurisprudence, 
sometimes emerging in the open articulation of different legal rules, 
more often emerging in divergent applications of the same legal rules.  
At the risk of over-simplifying the complexity of the issues, we 
suggest that one tension in particular has always dominated, and contin-
ues to dominate, the jurisprudence: the tension between formal and 
substantive understandings of equality. While these terms are often used 
in very different ways by different commentators, we believe they con-
tinue to have analytical salience.  
We understand formal equality to be concerned with ensuring that 
laws or policies do not impose disadvantages on individuals by treating 
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them according to false stereotypes associated with irrelevant personal 
characteristics. The focus of formal equality is on the individual’s situa-
tion, and on the relevance of the personal characteristics at issue to the 
objectives of the challenged law or policy. The “similarly situated” test, 
which measures means-ends rationality (or the fit between a challenged 
difference in treatment and the objectives of a law), is the most familiar 
expression of this understanding of formal equality. In contrast, we 
understand substantive equality to be concerned with ensuring that laws 
or policies do not impose subordinating treatment on groups already 
suffering social, political or economic disadvantage in Canadian society. 
The focus of substantive equality is on the group, and on the impact of 
the law on its social, economic or political conditions. Thus, for exam-
ple, in the debate about whether the opposite-sex requirement in the 
legal definition of marriage violates section 15, formal equality focuses 
on whether sexual orientation is relevant to the objectives of the legal 
definition of marriage; substantive equality focuses on whether the ex-
clusion from marriage has the effect of further subordinating gays and 
lesbians in Canadian society. 
It is sometimes remarked that Charter equality jurisprudence has re-
jected formal equality in favour of a substantive understanding of equal-
ity. As we understand them, however, both understandings of equality 
permeate the jurisprudence. The tests developed by the Supreme Court 
in Andrews and Law to guide the interpretation of section 15 can be seen 
as attempts to mediate the tension between them. The Court in Andrews 
stated that the similarly situated test should be rejected “as a fixed rule 
or formula for the resolution of equality questions arising under the 
Charter”.4 Nevertheless, a focus on means-ends rationality, or on deter-
mining whether a law is treating individuals according to relevant per-
sonal characteristics, remained central to the definition of discrimination 
put forward by McIntyre J. in Andrews.5 In other decisions, the Court 
                                                                                                                                
4  Supra, note 1. 
5  For example, McIntyre J. wrote that “[d]istinctions based on personal characteristics 
attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape 
the charge of discrimination, while those based on an individual’s merits and capacities will 
rarely be so classed”. Andrews, supra, note 1, at 174-75. A key issue arising from this decep-
tively simple formulation is how to determine when distinctions based on personal character-
istics reflect relevant merits and capacities as opposed to the stereotypical application of 
group characteristics. 
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has emphasized that overcoming group-based disadvantage is the domi-
nant purpose of section 15.6 It is fair to say, then, that section 15 has two 
purposes: ensuring that laws avoid treating individuals according to 
irrelevant personal characteristics, and ensuring that laws avoid further 
subordination of already disadvantaged groups.7 Section 15(1), with its 
focus on the equality rights of individuals, and section 15(2), with its 
focus on overcoming group-based disadvantage, reflect these twin pur-
poses. 
In many cases, formal and substantive understandings of equality 
will work together to lead to the same conclusion — because neither 
understanding of equality is violated, or both are. The latter kind of 
alignment is apparent, for example, in the challenges to the opposite-sex 
requirement of the legal definition of marriage. The exclusion treats 
individuals irrationally since sexual orientation does not relate to the 
objectives of contemporary marriage law. The exclusion also has the 
effect of further subordinating an already disadvantaged group.  
On some occasions, a law or policy may violate formal equality, but 
not implicate substantive equality because it does not further subordi-
nate, or ameliorate the conditions of an already disadvantaged group. In 
these circumstances, the courts have held that a violation of formal 
equality is sufficient to breach section 15(1). An equality claimant need 
not be a member of a disadvantaged group. This strikes us as a sensible 
conclusion, one that accords with the listing in section 15(1) of grounds 
of discrimination (e.g., sex) rather than disadvantaged groups (e.g., 
women). There is no problem with giving effect to formal equality per 
se; the problem is that formal equality, as the Court has recognized, and 
as section 15(2) underlines, is an incomplete understanding of equality. 
The tensions in the jurisprudence between formal and substantive 
understandings of equality come to the fore when they are not aligned in 
a particular case. This can happen in a number of ways.  
First, conflict can arise when a law violates formal equality and si-
multaneously promotes substantive equality by improving the condi-
tions of a disadvantaged group, as is often the case with affirmative 
                                                                                                                                
6  E.g., R. v. Turpin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, at 1333 (Justice Wil-
son described the purpose of s. 15 as “remedying or preventing discrimination against groups 
suffering social, political and legal disadvantage in our society”). 
7  Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 
S.C.R. 624, at para. 54. 
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action programs. In these instances, section 15(2) indicates that substan-
tive equality trumps formal inequality. The Court’s decisions in Law 
and Lovelace8 give expression to just such a priority of substantive over 
formal equality. They indicate that targeted ameliorative programs 
aimed at improving the conditions of disadvantaged groups will rarely 
violate section 15.  
A second kind of conflict, and the least openly addressed in the ju-
risprudence to date, arises when a law is consistent with formal equality 
yet violates substantive equality. This occurs when a law meets the 
similarly situated test — because the personal characteristic at issue is 
rationally related to the objectives of the challenged law — but has the 
effect of further subordinating an already disadvantaged group. How 
should courts resolve section 15 issues when consistence with formal 
equality clashes with the promotion of substantive inequality? The ten-
sion here is the reverse of the one arising with affirmative action pro-
grams. Yet the preference for substantive equality expressed in the text 
of section 15(2) should also point to the result here: just as the promo-
tion of substantive equality should not be inhibited by formal equality, 
the exacerbation of substantive inequality should not be excused by 
formal equality. Targeted affirmative action programs do not normally 
violate section 15 because the promotion of substantive equality justifies 
the violation of formal equality. Similarly, a law that exacerbates sub-
stantive inequality should violate section 15 even if it is consistent with 
formal equality. As we will see in our review of recent Supreme Court 
decisions in Part IV below, the opposite appears to be occurring: outside 
the affirmative action context, formal equality appears to be prevailing 
over substantive equality. As we will see in the next section, this is a 
concern shared by other commentators. 
II. CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S  
SECTION 15 DECISIONS 
While the approach to section 15 set out in Andrews received, and 
continues to receive, a welcome reception in the academic literature, the 
Law ruling has generated a largely negative response. For example, 
                                                                                                                                
8  Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36. 
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Christopher Bredt and Adam Dodek have expressed the concern that the 
human dignity standard introduced in Law is “hopelessly abstract”, and 
places too great a burden on equality claimants by shifting to section 15 
a balancing of individual rights and social objectives that ought to take 
place pursuant to section 1, where the government rather than the claim-
ant has the burden of proof.9 Similarly, Peter Hogg has argued that the 
“human dignity” test articulated in Law is “vague, confusing and bur-
densome to equality claimants”.10 He, like Bredt and Dodek, has urged a 
return to the simpler and more predictable test set out by the Court in 
Andrews.11 
Others have recognized that once we accept, as the Court did in An-
drews, that not all burdensome differences in treatment on the basis of 
prohibited grounds are discriminatory, a third step to the section 15 
inquiry is necessary to sort out discriminatory from non-discriminatory 
differences in treatment.12 However, a number of scholars have raised 
the alarm that the “relevancy” test favoured by a minority of the Court 
in the 1995 trilogy13 was not explicitly put to rest in the Law ruling. 
Sheilah Martin has argued that the question of whether differential 
treatment is relevant to a law’s objectives needs to be banished more 
clearly from section 15: 
While discrimination may sometimes involve an irrelevant personal 
characteristic it should not be elevated into a mandatory requirement…. 
[Relevancy] made discrimination into a fit between means and ends, 
                                                                                                                                
9  C. Bredt and A. Dodek, “Breaking the Law’s Grip on Equality: A New Paradigm for 
Section 15” (2003) 20 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 33, at 47. See also C. Bredt & I. Nishisato, “The 
Supreme Court’s New Equality Test: A Critique” (September-October 2000) 8 Canada Watch 
16. 
10  Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2003, student 
ed.), at 1080. 
11  Id., at 1081. For other critiques of the indeterminancy of the human dignity standard, 
see S. Martin, “Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals” (2001) 80 Can. Bar 
Rev. 299, 329-32; J. Ross, “A Flawed Synthesis of the Law” (2000) 11 Const. Forum 74; D. 
Pothier, “Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real People’s Real Experiences” (2001) 
13 C.J.W.L. 37, at 56: “Human dignity is a concept that is malleable enough that it can mean 
whatever the judges want it to mean”. 
12  E.g., D. Réaume, “Discrimination and Dignity” (2003) 63 Louisiana L. Rev. 645; D. 
Greschner, “Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 299; D. 
Greschner, “The Purpose of Canadian Equality Rights” (2002) 6 Review of Constitutional 
Studies 290. 
13  See the opinions of La Forest J. in Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, [1995] 
S.C.J. No. 43 and Gonthier J. in Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44. 
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without subjecting the ends to sufficient scrutiny or gauging the law’s 
social underpinnings or impacts and without calling on the government to 
justify its actions.14 
While in her view an assessment of the fit between means and ends 
is a necessary element of the Charter analysis, Martin argues that it is 
preferable to have the government bear the burden of addressing the 
issue pursuant to section 1.15 
Dianne Pothier’s review of the Court’s first decisions applying the 
Law test echoed Martin’s concern that the scope of section 15 is being 
unjustly restricted by the centrality placed on relevance in the human 
dignity analysis.16 Similarly, Donna Greschner has urged the Court to 
reject the “discredited ‘relevancy’ test” on the grounds that it “is formalis-
tic and undermines a substantive approach to equality”.17 Diana Majury 
likewise expresses the concern that some of the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions “raise the spectre that the Court is slipping backward in its un-
derstanding and commitment to substantive equality”.18 
Another group of more intemperate critics paint a very different pic-
ture of the Court’s Charter jurisprudence. Rather than finding signs of a 
compromised commitment to substantive equality, they accuse the 
Court of being captured by the claims of equality-seeking groups and 
their powerful allies in government, academia and the legal profession. 
Thus, for example, F.L. Morton and Rainer Knopff have suggested that 
“the Court Party”, a coalition of social interests that includes equality-
seeking groups like LEAF and EGALE, has hijacked the Court by per-
suading it to adopt a “revolutionary human rights understanding of the 
Charter’s equality provisions”.19 Similarly, Robert Martin argues that 
the Court has embraced a “dominant orthodoxy” shaped in large part by 
interest group and identity politics around issues of sex, ethnicity and 
                                                                                                                                
14  Supra, note 11, at 327. 
15  Id., at 362. 
16  D. Pothier, supra, note 11, at 56. 
17  D. Greschner, “Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?”, supra, note 12, at 301. 
18  D. Majury, “The Charter, Equality Rights, and Women: Equivocation and Celebra-
tion” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 297, at 306. 
19  F.L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Peter-
borough: Broadview Press, 2000), at 68. 
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sexual orientation.20 Martin is particularly troubled, and at his most 
polemical, regarding what he sees as “feminist domination of the legal 
and political processes in Canada”.21 He notes that feminist and other 
groups seeking social justice have focused on section 15 of the Charter, 
and “their preference for section 15 has resonated with the judges of the 
Supreme Court and, as a result, the section gives every sign of eclipsing 
the rest of the Charter”.22 He suggests that “[t]he dominant orthodoxy 
has become the primary factor that determines the outcome of litigation 
before the [Supreme] Court”.23 
Does the Court’s record in section 15 cases support the claims of the 
critics that the Court is backing away from its commitment to substan-
tive equality, or, conversely, that it is captured by the aspirations and 
theories of equality-seeking groups? Back in 1989, just prior to the 
release of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Andrews, Gwen Brodsky and 
Shelagh Day published an empirical analysis of section 15 cases that 
demonstrated that a disproportionate number of equality rights claims 
were being brought by members of non-disadvantaged groups and that 
an alarmingly small number of claims had been raised by individuals or 
groups identified by certain prohibited grounds of discrimination.24 No 
doubt the Andrews decision altered that trend by confining equality 
claims to challenges to differential treatment on the basis of enumerated 
or analogous grounds. However, since Brodsky and Day’s study, there 
has been little in the way of empirical examinations attempting to meas-
ure in quantitative terms the relative success rate of section 15 claims. 
We have attempted to rectify that situation, at least in part, by undertak-
ing a quantitative examination of the courts’ disposition of section 15 
claims since the 1989 ruling in Andrews to determine whether the record 
supports the kinds of concerns raised by the critics described above. 
                                                                                                                                
20  R.I. Martin, The Most Dangerous Branch: How the Supreme Court Has Undermined 
Our Law and Our Democracy (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2003). 
21  Id., at 24. See also id., at 124 “Feminist thought and ideology are central elements of 
the ruling orthodoxy”. 
22  Id., at 21. 
23  Id., at 35. 
24  G. Brodsky and S. Day, Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step 
Forward or Two Steps Back? (Ottawa: CACSW, 1989). 
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III. SUCCESS RATES OF SECTION 15 CLAIMS 
Tabulated in Appendix A are the 43 decisions of the Supreme Court 
of Canada in which a majority of the Court ruled on a section 15 claim, 
beginning with Andrews and ending with its most recent equality rights 
ruling in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. 
Canada.25 We have also compiled a sample of lower court section 15 
rulings during the decade that Andrews was the leading case (February 
2, 1989 to March 25, 1999) and during the five years since Law was 
decided (March 25, 1999). The sample includes all lower court deci-
sions disposing of section 15 claims that were reported in the Dominion 
Law Reports, the Federal Court Reports, or that are available in Quick-
Law’s federal court judgments database or provincial judgments data-
bases for the prairie and Atlantic provinces.26 This yielded a database of 
323 lower court rulings.27 We then classified the Supreme Court and 
lower court rulings on the basis of whether or not the court found a 
violation of the Charter in its disposition of the section 15 claim. This 
analysis yielded the following data on success rates: 
 














The success rate of section 15 claims at the Supreme Court, 27.9 per 
cent, is significantly lower than the average success rate of all Charter 
claims before the Court, which, according to Patrick Monahan and Nad-
ine Blum, hovered around 35 per cent from 1991-2002,28 or a slightly 
lower rate (33 or 34 per cent) according to studies by F.L. Morton et al. 
and James Kelly covering the periods from 1982-1992 and 1993-1997 
                                                                                                                                
25  [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6. 
26  Our sample does not yet include decisions reported in QuickLaw’s Ontario, Quebec 
or British Columbia provincial judgments databases. 
27  The full list of lower court decisions included in the sample reported here is available 
from the authors. 
28  P. J. Monahan and N. Blum, “Constitutional Cases 2002: An Overview” (2003) 20 
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 3, at 6-7. 
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respectively.29 The success rate of section 15 claims at the lower courts 
is substantially lower (21.1 per cent) than at the Supreme Court (27.9 
per cent) over the 15-year period since 1989. This is not surprising since 
the Supreme Court’s position as the final court of appeal, together with 
its ability to control its docket, means that the equality claims it adjudi-
cates will be drawn largely from the pool of more credible claims pre-
sented in the lower courts. Another notable feature of the data is that the 
success rate of section 15 claims at both the Supreme Court and lower 
courts has increased since the Law ruling compared to the Andrews 
decade. 
Of course, there are a number of reasons to be cautious before draw-
ing conclusions from this data. The “success” or “failure” of a section 
15 claim is not necessarily a reliable indicator of a court’s commitment 
to upholding equality rights. Not all section 15 claims rely on a desir-
able or even plausible interpretation of equality rights. Thus, for exam-
ple, when Imre Finta’s equality rights challenge to the war criminal 
provisions of the Criminal Code failed,30 few would consider its dis-
missal as anything but a victory for our understandings of equality. Yet 
it is counted here as a “failed” section 15 claim. Other unsuccessful 
claims are counted as “failed” even though they may articulate a vision 
of substantive equality that will assist disadvantaged groups in political 
and legal struggles.31 Conversely, some “successful” claims may articu-
late narrow or regressive conceptions of equality. Clearly, then, the 
quantitative summary we are presenting here is a crude measure of 
“success” in equality litigation. It needs to be supplemented by a variety 
of other kinds of studies to get a full picture of the results and the impact 
of equality litigation. Quantitative analysis needs to be supplemented by 
the traditional kinds of qualitative analysis that critically evaluate the 
                                                                                                                                
29  F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell & T. Riddell, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms: A Descriptive Analysis of the First Decade, 1982-1992” (1994) 5 N.J.C.L. 1; J. Kelly, 
“The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Rebalancing of Liberal Constitutionalism in 
Canada, 1982-1997” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 625. In their analysis of the Court’s first 
195 Charter decisions, Morton et al. found that the Charter claimant succeeded in 33 per cent 
of the cases. Kelly added to the Morton et al. study an analysis of the Court’s 157 Charter 
rulings between 1993-1997, and found the Charter claimant succeeded 34 per cent of the time 
from 1982-1997. 
30  R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, [1994] S.C.J. No. 26. 
31  E.g., Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872, [1993] S.C.J. 
No. 81. 
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substance of equality decisions.32 We also need more investigation of 
the impact of legal decisions on political actors and policy develop-
ment,33 and, perhaps most importantly, we need more inquiries into how 
and in what ways policy changes generated by equality litigation are 
actually having an impact on the lives of equality litigants and the 
groups they represent. Quantitative analysis of cases only offers a 
glimpse of overall trends in courts’ decision-making — it cannot in 
itself provide explanations for those trends or reveal anything useful 
about the impact of equality litigation on government policy or people’s 
lives. 
Bearing in mind these caveats, what can our data tell us about the 
courts’ handling of Charter equality claims? The increased success rate 
of section 15 claims since Law casts some doubt on the thesis that the 
Law test places greater burdens on equality claimants than the Andrews 
ruling did. The Andrews opinion posited an apparently straightforward 
definition of discrimination: differences in treatment on prohibited 
grounds based on prescribed group characteristics would normally be 
discriminatory, while differences in treatment on prohibited grounds 
that reflected actual merits and capacities would rarely be discrimina-
tory. The Law test is an attempt to work out the complexities buried in 
this deceptively simple formulation. As Denise Réaume has noted, the 
human dignity approach to discrimination “may be less a new threshold 
requirement of section 15 than a matter of making explicit a condition 
already present”.34 
The increased success rate in the past five years is likely attribut-
able, at least in part, to factors other than the doctrinal differences be-
tween Andrews and Law. It seems likely, for example, that potential 
litigants and their legal advisors have become more sophisticated in 
predicting which cases are likely to succeed and more wary of launching 
equality challenges as the evidentiary and doctrinal hurdles they face 
                                                                                                                                
32  We attempt to join these two types of analysis in Part IV, below. 
33  Commendable examples include Janet Hiebert, Charter Conflicts: What Is Parlia-
ment’s Role? (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002); C. Manfredi, 
Feminist Activism in the Supreme Court: Legal Mobilization and the Women’s Legal Educa-
tion and Action Fund (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004); F.L. Morton and A. Allen, “Feminists 
and the Courts: Measuring Success in Interest Group Litigation in Canada” (2001) 34 Can. J. 
Pol. Sci. 55. 
34  D. Réaume, “Discrimination and Dignity”, supra, note 12, at 654. 
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have become better understood. It may also be that the resources avail-
able to equality-seeking groups to fund litigation have declined and that 
this has led to a concentration of effort on equality litigation with rela-
tively high chances of success. We found some support for these hy-
potheses by tracking the annual success rate at the lower courts to see 
how it varied over the fifteen-year period. We found a success rate of 
15.6 per cent at the lower courts in the first five years after Andrews 
(1989-1993: 21/128), followed by an increase to 24.5 per cent in the 
second half of the Andrews decade (1994-1998: 23/94), a rate that has 
increased slightly to 26.3 per cent since the Law ruling (25/95). While 
the number of Supreme Court decisions is much smaller, the data also 
indicates an increased success rate since the mid-1990s (see Appendices 
A and B, below). 
Overall, the data suggests that the success rate of section 15 claims 
has been relatively low, compared to Charter claims generally, through-
out the Andrews decade and the first five years under Law. The data 
does not support the view that the Andrews test operated in a manner 
more supportive of equality claimants. Nor does it support the view that 
the courts have been particularly receptive to the claims of equality-
seeking groups. For example, examining the record of Supreme Court 
decisions, it is striking that six of the nine grounds of discrimination 
listed in section 15 have not given rise to a single successful claim (race, 
national origin, ethnic origin, colour, religion, mental disability). Since 
there have been either no claims considered by the Court, or very few, 
on each of these grounds, this is a reminder that the costs of litigation 
remain the most formidable barrier to the affirmation and protection of 
equality rights.  
Moreover, the success rate at the Supreme Court of claims based on 
a number of the enumerated grounds is low. For example, the success 
rate of claims based on age discrimination is 20 per cent (1/5). The 
success rate of claims based on sex discrimination is 25 per cent (2/8), 
and in the two successful cases, the claimants were men. This is not the 
record of a Court captured by the interests and ideologies of equality-
seeking groups. 
Criticisms that the Law test has made it harder to assert a successful 
section 15 claim have focused on its approach to the third stage of the 
section 15 analysis, namely, its definition of discrimination as a viola-
tion of human dignity, to be assessed by reference to four contextual 
factors from the point of view of a reasonable person in the claimant’s 
position. The critics have raised concerns that this third stage of the 
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equality analysis, following on the establishment of differential treat-
ment (1st stage) on the basis of a prohibited ground (2nd stage), places 
onerous burdens on equality claimants. To attempt to measure whether 
the record of decision-making lends credence to this concern, we have 
categorized the cases where section 15 claims failed according to the 
stage of the analysis at which they foundered. The results are as follows: 
 
Stage of analysis at which unsuccessful section 15 claims failed35 
 
1 = differential treatment 
2 = prohibited ground  
3 = discrimination 
s. 1 = s. 15 violation upheld pursuant to s. 1 
 
 Under Andrews — failure at which stage  
 
     1               2                 3              s. 1 
Under Law — failure at which stage  
 




































As one would expect, the data reveals that a larger proportion of 
equality claims were dismissed at the prohibited grounds stage of analy-
sis during the Andrews decade than has been the case in the last five 
years. As different personal characteristics are rejected or accepted as 
analogous grounds, it is predictable that the number of claims dismissed 
at this stage would diminish. 
The Supreme Court data supports the view that the human dignity 
stage of the Law analysis has posed a formidable barrier to equality 
claimants, accounting for the dismissal of the claim in almost two-thirds 
(7/11) of the unsuccessful section 15 cases in the past five years. This is 
a significant increase from the Court’s record during the Andrews dec-
ade, when more claims were dismissed at the first two stages of the 
equality analysis or by upholding violations of section 15 pursuant to 
section 1. This change in the pattern of Supreme Court decision-making 
                                                                                                                                
35  The cases tabulated here do not include all failed s. 15 claims in our sample. Omit-
ted from the tabulation are claims that failed on the grounds that the claimant could not 
invoke s. 15 (e.g., on the grounds that corporations cannot claim s. 15 rights). 
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supports the concern expressed by a number of commentators that the 
Law test has shifted the burden of analysis from section 1 to the human 
dignity stage of the section 15 test.36  On the other hand, the pattern of 
lower court decisions is very different. After Law, more than two-thirds 
of the section 15 claims rejected by the lower courts fail at the first two 
stages of the equality analysis, as they did in the Andrews decade. The 
number of claims failing at the third stage of the analysis has decreased 
since Law. Compared to the record during the Andrews decade, the 
number of equality violations that lower courts have found to be justi-
fied pursuant to section 1 has increased. 
Members of the Supreme Court have suggested on a number of oc-
casions that it will be rare that discrimination will not also be estab-
lished if the claimant has succeeded in demonstrating differential 
treatment on the basis of a prohibited ground.37 At the Supreme Court 
level, this prognostication has proven to be dramatically inaccurate. The 
Court has regularly found differential treatment on a prohibited ground 
to be non-discriminatory. It has done so in seven of the 16 cases where 
the Court applied the Law test to resolve a section 15 claim. The strik-
ingly different pattern at the lower courts reminds us that the Supreme 
Court data reflects a skewed selection of section 15 cases as a whole, 
one that likely overemphasizes the dispositive role, in practice, of the 
human dignity stage of the Law test.  
The section 15 cases to which the Supreme Court gives leave are 
more likely to be well-presented and well-funded claims that involve the 
most challenging aspects of equality litigation, and thus are more likely to 
turn on the Court’s conclusion at the human dignity stage. At the lower 
courts, the vast majority (71 per cent) of unsuccessful equality claims 
since Law have failed at either the differential treatment or prohibited 
ground stages of analysis, while 14.5 per cent have failed at the human 
dignity stage of the Law test. Interestingly, a comparable proportion (15.8 
per cent) of section 15 claims failed at the discrimination stage in the 
lower courts during the Andrews decade. Establishing differences in 
treatment on the basis of a prohibited ground did not assure success for 
                                                                                                                                
36  Bredt and Dodek, supra, note 9; Martin, supra, note 11; Hogg, supra, note 10. 
37  Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358, at para. 69, [1997] 
S.C.J. No. 26; Law, supra, note 3, at para. 110; Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychi-
atric Institute), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625, at para. 81, [1999] S.C.J. No. 31. 
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equality claimants during the Andrews decade or the first five years under 
Law. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S APPLICATION OF THE FOUR 
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS IN LAW 
In the Law case, Iacobucci J. articulated four “contextual factors” to 
serve as guides to the determination of whether or not differential treat-
ment on a prohibited ground of discrimination would constitute dis-
crimination in a substantive sense by implicating the claimant’s human 
dignity. The four factors, expressed in terms that lean towards a finding 
of discrimination, are: (1) the presence of historic disadvantage; (2) the 
lack of correspondence between the ground of discrimination at issue 
and the actual needs, capacities and circumstances of the claimant; (3) 
the absence of a purpose or effect that ameliorates the condition of an-
other more disadvantaged group; and (4) the importance of the interest 
interfered with by the state.38 The Court stated that these factors are not 
an exhaustive description of the relevant considerations, but it has not 
since articulated any others.  
One of the difficulties of applying the Law test is that, apart from 
indicating that the first factor, historical disadvantage, is the “most com-
pelling”39 indicator of discrimination, the Court did not discuss the rela-
tive weight to be given to each factor. This is not a problem when all 
factors point towards the same conclusion, which is one of the reasons 
why all 15 judges who have heard the recent Charter challenges to the 
opposite-sex requirement of the legal definition of marriage have found 
that it discriminates against same-sex couples.40 The Law factors work 
                                                                                                                                
38  The Court’s description of the four contextual factors is set out in Law, supra, note 3, 
at paras. 62-75. 
39  Id., at para. 63. 
40  Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529, [2003] O.J. No. 
2268 (C.A.), affirming the finding that the definition of marriage violates s. 15 reached by the 
Divisional Court (2002), 215 D.L.R. (4th) 223, [2003] O.J. No. 2714 (Div. Ct.); EGALE 
Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), (2003) 225 D.L.R. (4th) 472 (B.C.C.A.), over-
turning judgment of Pitfield J. finding the definition of marriage violated s. 15 but could be 
upheld pursuant to s. 1 (2001), 88 C.R.R. (2d) 322, [2001] B.C.J. No. 1995 (S.C.); Ligue 
catholique pour les droits de l’homme c. Hendricks, [2004] Q.J. No. 2593 (Que. C.A.), 
affirming the judgment of Lemelin J., Hendricks c. Quebec (Procureur general), [2002] Q.J. 
No. 3816 (Que. S.C.). 
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well when a government law or policy clearly violates both formal and 
substantive conceptions of equality. The legal bar to same-sex marriage 
has the effect of further subordinating a disadvantaged group by denying 
them entry into one of society’s fundamental legal institutions. More-
over, the legal bar to same-sex marriage is not designed to improve the 
conditions of some other disadvantaged group. For these reasons, the 
legal definition of marriage contributes to substantive inequality. But the 
legal bar also violates formal equality, because the grounds of sex and 
sexual orientation do not correspond to any of the objectives of the 
contemporary legal regulation of marriage. Now that marital rights and 
obligations are framed in gender-neutral terms, and the law no longer 
inhibits people’s freedom to choose whether or not to procreate, within 
or outside of marriage, the argument that the sex or sexual orientation of 
persons seeking to legally marry is somehow relevant to state objectives 
founders on irrationality. 
The four contextual factors operated effectively and harmoniously 
to expose the weakness of the government’s position on the marriage 
issue. But what happens when the factors point in different directions? 
The combination of the first, third and fourth factors should serve to 
maintain a focus on substantive equality: they examine whether the state 
has imposed further burdens on already disadvantaged groups, and, if 
so, whether those burdens are a result of a targeted program that amelio-
rates the condition of an equally or more disadvantaged group.41  
The second factor, on the other hand, while it is framed in terms of 
“correspondence” between the grounds at issue and the claimant’s actual 
situation, replicates the “relevance” or “similarly situated” tests that 
earlier judgments of the Court rejected as an insufficient guide to the 
interpretation of section 15.42 The correspondence factor inevitably 
                                                                                                                                
41  In Lovelace v. Canada, supra, note 8, the Court relied on the ameliorative purpose 
factor to affirm the principle that the state does not discriminate by adopting targeted amelio-
rative programs for disadvantaged groups, even if those groups are identified by prohibited 
grounds of discrimination. The Court also struggled to explain how the correspondence factor 
— or the formal equality, similarly situated test — was not violated by the program. This was 
unconvincing. In our view, it would have been more convincing to acknowledge that the 
program violated formal equality (because the distinction between band and non-band Abo-
riginal groups was a poor marker of economic need), and rest the decision upholding the 
program on the grounds that the promotion of substantive equality through targeted ameliora-
tive programs can justify violations of formal equality. 
42  See Andrews, supra, note 1, at 168; Miron, supra, note 13, at 488, per McLachlin J.; 
Egan, supra, note 13, at 546-48, per L’Heureux-Dubé J. 
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involves a consideration of the objective of the challenged law or policy, 
and a consideration of whether the differential treatment on a prohibited 
ground is relevant to the achievement of that objective. In other words, 
the correspondence test asks whether the claimant is similarly situated to 
those receiving different treatment, measured by reference to differences 
that are relevant to the state’s objectives. Whether we label this ap-
proach “correspondence”, “relevance” or “means/ends fit”, they are all 
variations on the familiar Aristotelian ideal of formal equality: it is not 
discriminatory to treat likes alike, and unalikes unalike. Since we are all 
alike in some ways, and unalike in others, the question boils down to: 
which differences are relevant in this context? Does the differential 
treatment at issue correspond to relevant differences in people’s actual 
situations? The correspondence factor is the similarly situated test. Both 
are inquiries into whether the differential treatment is imposed on the 
basis of a characteristic that is relevant to the objectives of the law or 
policy at issue.  
The four Law factors can thus be seen as an attempt to mediate be-
tween formal equality (or rational treatment of individuals) and a sub-
stantive conception of equality aimed at ameliorating the conditions of 
disadvantaged groups. Much of the time we do not need to choose be-
tween them because formal and substantive conceptions of equality do 
not always conflict. When a substantive equality analysis and a formal 
equality analysis point in the same direction, the result of a court’s con-
sideration of the four contextual factors in Law is straightforward. This 
will be true, for example, when the challenged state action is rational 
and does not subordinate disadvantaged groups. It will also be true when 
the state imposes subordinating and irrational differential treatment on a 
disadvantaged group. But when formal and substantive equality point in 
different directions, how is a court to weigh the competing factors in 
deciding whether the claimant has established discrimination in a sub-
stantive sense? As we discussed in Part I above, the Court has not yet 
fully resolved this issue. When the state violates formal equality and 
promotes substantive equality by adopting targeted ameliorative pro-
grams, section 15 is not violated: substantive equality trumps formal 
inequality. But when subordinating effects on disadvantaged groups 
result from the rational pursuit of a state objective, the Court’s recent 
decisions suggest that formal equality trumps substantive inequality. 
The following chart lists the Court’s determinations on each of the four 
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contextual factors in the fifteen rulings that involved some discussion of 
this stage of the Law analysis.43 













1. Law44 x x x - No 
2. M. v. H.45 ➼  ➼  ➼  ➼  Yes 
3. Corbiere46 ➼  ➼  - ➼  Yes 
4. Winko47 ➼  x - - No 
5. Delisle48 - x - - No 
6. Lovelace49 ➼  x x neutral No 
7. Granovsky50 x x x neutral No 
8. Little Sisters51 ➼  ➼  - ➼  Yes 
9. Lavoie plurality52 ➼  ➼  ➼  ➼  Yes 
10. Gosselin53 x x neutral x No 
11. Walsh54 - x - - No 
12. Siemens55 - x - - No 
13. Trociuk56 x ➼  x ➼  Yes 
14. Martin57 neutral ➼  ➼  ➼  Yes 
                                                                                                                                
43  Omitted from the chart is R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, 
[2003] S.C.J. No. 79, the one post-Law case in which a s. 15 claim was disposed of entirely at 
the first (differential treatment) or second (prohibited ground) stages of the s. 15 analysis. In 
Malmo-Levine the claim that the marihuana possession offence violated s. 15 was dismissed 
at the prohibited grounds stage. “Pot smoking” was not analogous to other prohibited 
grounds. To hold otherwise, Gonthier and Binnie JJ. wrote, at para. 185, “would simply be to 
create a parody of a noble purpose”. 
44  Law, supra, note 3. 
45  [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, [1999] S.C.J. No. 23. 
46  Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 24. 
47  Winko, supra, note 37. 
48  Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989, [1999] S.C.J. No. 43. 
49  Supra, note 41. 
50  Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 
703, [2000] S.C.J. No. 29. 
51  Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 
S.C.R. 1120, [2000] S.C.J. No. 66. 
52  Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769, [2002] S.C.J. No. 24. 
53  Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, [2002] S.C.J. No. 85. 
54  Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325, [2002] S.C.J. No. 84. 
55  Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 6, [2002] S.C.J. No. 69. 
56  Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835, [2003] S.C.J. No. 32. 
57  Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, [2003] 
S.C.J. No. 54. 
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15. CFCYL58 ➼  x ➼  ➼  No 
 
X  =  the Court found this factor leaned against a finding of 
discrimination  
➼  =  the Court found this factor leaned toward a finding of dis-
crimination  
neutral =  the Court found this factor did not lean in either direction 
- =  this factor was not addressed 
 
 
The pattern of results in these Supreme Court cases applying the 
Law test makes clear that the correspondence factor has thus far 
proven to be the most important factor in determining whether or not 
the Court finds a difference in treatment on a prohibited ground to be 
discriminatory. Historical disadvantage, far from being the “most 
compelling” factor as Iacobucci J. suggested it should be in Law,59 has 
played a secondary role. The Court’s finding on historical disadvan-
tage has supported the outcome of the discrimination inquiry in only 
seven of the 15 cases. The record of the third and fourth factors is 
similar: the findings on ameliorative purpose and the importance of the 
interest at stake have supported the outcome of the discrimination 
inquiry in six of 15 and eight of 15 cases respectively. The finding on 
the correspondence factor, on the other hand, has aligned with the 
outcome of the discrimination inquiry in all 15 cases. In short, it seems 
that the finding on the correspondence factor and the conclusion on 
discrimination invariably correspond. 
The dominance of correspondence, or formal equality, in the 
Court’s recent rulings occurs in a number of different ways. A violation 
of formal equality may be sufficient to establish that differential treat-
ment on a prohibited ground is discriminatory. An example is the 
Court’s decision last year in Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General).60 In that case, a father challenged a provision of the Vital 
Statistics Act61 that permitted a mother to exclude a father from having 
                                                                                                                                
58  Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 
76, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6. 
59  Law, supra, note 3, at para. 63.  
60  Supra, note 56. 
61  R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 479. 
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his particulars included in their child’s birth registration and from par-
ticipating in choosing the child’s surname. While Deschamps J.’s opin-
ion on behalf of the Court did not address the correspondence factor by 
name, the gist of her reasoning was that the prohibited ground at issue, 
sex, did not always correspond to good reasons for excluding fathers 
from the birth registration and naming process. The arbitrariness of the 
exclusion drove Deschamps J. to the conclusion that the difference in 
treatment was discriminatory, notwithstanding that the claimant, or 
fathers generally, could not be said to be members of a historically dis-
advantaged group. 
The overriding importance accorded to the correspondence factor 
was also apparent in the other successful section 15 claim in last year’s 
Supreme Court decisions, Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) 
v. Martin.62 In finding that the exclusion of chronic pain claimants from 
workers’ compensation benefits and services amounted to discrimina-
tion on the basis of physical disability, Gonthier J. commented that the 
lack of correspondence between the differential treatment and the true 
needs and circumstances of the claimants was “at the heart of the section 
15(1) claim”.63 Since the lack of correspondence was the “gravamen of 
the appellants’ section 15 claim”,64 a consideration of relative historic 
disadvantage was “largely inappropriate”.65 
Finding irrational differences in treatment on the basis of prohibited 
grounds — that is, violations of formal equality — to be sufficient to 
lead to a finding of discrimination, as occurred in Trociuk and Martin, is 
not always troubling. Formal equality is not necessarily inconsistent 
with substantive equality, and of course formal inequality may be the 
means (as in Martin) through which substantive inequality is perpetu-
ated. The main concern with the Court’s analysis in cases like Trociuk 
and Martin is that by foregrounding formal inequality, the Court may 
put aside its stated commitment to treating the achievement of substan-
tive equality as section 15’s ultimate purpose.66  
                                                                                                                                
62  Supra, note 57. 
63  Id., at para. 89. 
64  Id., at para. 91. 
65  Id., at para. 89. 
66  For an argument that this is precisely what happened in Trociuk, supra, note 56, see 
H. Lessard, “Mothers, Fathers, and Naming:  Reflections on the Law Equality Framework and 
Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General)” (2004) C.J.W.L. (forthcoming). 
124  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
 
Another, and more troubling, way in which formal equality is domi-
nating the Court’s equality jurisprudence is that in some cases a lack of 
correspondence is being found to be a necessary ingredient of a finding 
of discrimination. Thus, in a handful of cases, the Court’s finding that 
the ground of discrimination corresponded to actual circumstances that 
were relevant to the law was the sole basis for concluding that discrimi-
nation had not been demonstrated.67 Perhaps the starkest example of this 
trend is the recent decision in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth 
and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General)68 in which a majority of the 
Court rejected the argument that section 43 of the Criminal Code dis-
criminated on the basis of age by exempting parents, guardians and 
teachers from prosecution for assault when they use reasonable force to 
correct children in their care. Chief Justice McLachlin, writing on behalf 
of the 6-3 majority that upheld the legislation, concluded in one short 
paragraph that three of the contextual factors leaned toward a finding of 
discrimination: 
The first Law factor, vulnerability and pre-existing disadvantage, is clearly 
met in this case. Children are a highly vulnerable group. Similarly, the 
fourth factor is met. The nature of the interest affected — physical 
integrity — is profound. No one contends that s. 43 is designed to 
ameliorate the condition of another more disadvantaged group: the third 
factor.69 
Nevertheless, the Chief Justice went on to conclude that the subordinat-
ing differential treatment was not discriminatory in a substantive sense. 
Her conclusion in this regard turned entirely on the correspondence 
factor: age, she held, corresponds to the need to use corrective and rea-
sonable force in some circumstances.  
The result of permitting the correspondence factor to trump the 
other three factors is that even differential treatment on a prohibited 
ground that further subordinates a disadvantaged group will not be 
found to violate section 15 if the claimant fails to demonstrate that the 
law or policy at issue lacks a rational basis. The state is not called upon 
to justify its imposition of subordinating differential treatment on disad-
                                                                                                                                
67  Winko, supra, note 37; Delisle, supra, note 48; Walsh, supra, note 54; Siemens, su-
pra, note 55. 
68  Supra, note 58. 
69  Id., at para. 56. 
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vantaged groups. Rather, the claimant has the burden of proving the lack 
of a rational connection between the personal characteristic at issue and 
the objective of the challenged law. The problem with this approach is 
that it too readily forgives the exacerbation of substantive inequality. 
V. REVISITING THE LAW TEST 
Our review of Supreme Court of Canada and lower court rulings on 
section 15 claims since the 1989 decision in Andrews reveals that, far 
from being captured by equality-seeking groups, the courts have ap-
proached section 15 cautiously from the outset. Many section 15 rulings 
reflect a persistent anxiety about the breadth and depth of its potential 
impact on state policies involving the distribution of material resources. 
Section 15 claims have consistently received a less receptive audience in 
the courts than is the norm for Charter claims generally. This was true in 
the decade during which Andrews was the leading section 15 case, and 
has remained true in the five years since the Law test displaced Andrews 
as the template for the adjudication of equality rights claims. Perhaps 
surprisingly, in light of the apparent additional burdens placed on sec-
tion 15 claimants by the human dignity analysis in Law, the success rate 
of section 15 claims in the past five years has been higher, at both the 
Supreme Court and in the lower courts, than it was in the Andrews dec-
ade. This may be explained in large part by a deepening appreciation on 
the part of potential claimants and their lawyers of the nature of the 
hurdles section 15 claims must surmount and thus a declining propensity 
to launch relatively high-risk challenges. But it may also suggest that the 
critics of the Law ruling should be wary of exaggerating the positive 
aspects of the Andrews test and the manner of its application up until 
1999. Equality claimants have faced long odds and significant jurispru-
dential obstacles to successful Charter challenges throughout the past 15 
years. This is so even though equality-seeking groups have succeeded in 
establishing many of the key elements of a substantive conception of 
equality.70 Putting substantive equality to work to achieve favourable 
litigation outcomes appears to be another matter entirely. 
                                                                                                                                
70  See Manfredi, supra, note 33, chapter 2, for an account of LEAF’s successes in this 
regard. 
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Section 15 of the Charter has had considerable influence in the 
courts and in governments “as an authoritative normative statement 
about fundamental values of equality”.71 The Court is comfortable giv-
ing weight to equality values when interpreting legal rights,72 or the 
right to vote (as in the Figueroa73 ruling last year), or when considering 
whether limits on rights or freedoms can be upheld under section 1.74 
While equality values have exerted an important influence on Charter 
interpretation and the design and administration of government poli-
cies,75 the results of Supreme Court section 15 cases have had, with a 
few exceptions, a modest impact on government policies and, for the 
most part, have been disappointing from the point of view of equality-
seeking groups. Why is the court so apparently comfortable with equal-
ity values but so cautious about equality rights? A large part of the an-
swer probably lies in the potential breadth of section 15’s impact on 
complex areas of redistributive social policy. The Court is manifestly 
uncomfortable with equality rights claims that directly target the ways in 
which governments raise and distribute material resources in areas such 
as income tax, pension or social assistance policy. These kinds of chal-
lenges often face a steeper than usual uphill battle, and the quality of the 
Court’s reasoning often suffers. The Symes,76 Thibaudeau77 and 
Gosselin78 rulings are cases in point. 
The successful section 15 claims establishing a right to marry for 
same-sex couples in British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec demonstrate 
the power of the Law analysis when formal and substantive equality 
analyses coincide and what is at stake, primarily, is the state’s distribu-
                                                                                                                                
71  L. Smith, “Have the Equality Rights Made Any Difference?”, in P. Bryden, S. 
Davis and J. Russell eds., Protecting Rights and Freedoms: Essays on the Charter’s Place 
in Canada’s Political, Legal and Intellectual Life (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1994) p. 60, at p. 72. 
72  An example is the weight given to sex equality in upholding sexual assault legisla-
tion alleged to violate the rights of accused persons. See the discussion in Manfredi, supra, 
note 33, chapter 5. 
73  Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, [2003] S.C.J. No. 37. 
74  P.W. Hogg, “Equality as a Charter Value in Constitutional Interpretation”, Claire 
L’Heureux-Dubé International Conference, Québec City, (21 March 2003). 
75  See Hiebert, supra, note 33. 
76  Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695, [1993] S.C.J. No. 131. 
77  Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627, [1995] S.C.J. No. 42. 
78  Supra, note 53. 
(2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) What’s Law Good For? 127 
 
tion of symbolic as opposed to material resources.79 Despite this com-
pelling example of the power of the Law analysis to displace state poli-
cies resting on deeply rooted, irrational and subordinating prejudices, 
our examination of the Court’s recent section 15 decisions reveals a 
danger that the Law test can readily serve to forgive state policies that 
impose subordinating differential treatment on disadvantaged groups so 
long as those policies have a rational basis. 
To reduce this danger, the Court needs to adopt a test for the justifi-
cation of subordinating treatment of disadvantaged groups that demands 
more from government. Rather than forgive such treatment whenever 
there is a relevant connection between the differential subordinating 
treatment on a prohibited ground and a state objective, the government 
should be held to a higher standard. Governments should have to dem-
onstrate not only that they have chosen rational means for the pursuit of 
compelling objectives, but also that they had no other options that would 
have had a less burdensome impact on disadvantaged groups. This 
higher standard could be adopted by treating the demonstration of sub-
ordinating differential treatment on the basis of a prohibited ground as 
sufficient to establish a violation of section 15. A consideration of the 
relevance of the prohibited ground to state objectives, or the test of 
means/ends fit, could be left in such cases to the section 1 stage of 
analysis as several commentators have recommended.80 South African 
equality jurisprudence treats the lack of a rational basis as sufficient but 
not necessary to establish a violation of equality. In other words, the 
presence of a rational basis, or a correspondence between the prohibited 
grounds and state objectives, is not sufficient to establish a lack of dis-
crimination.81 South African judges have fashioned an equality jurispru-
dence that borrows heavily from the ideas of Supreme Court of Canada 
                                                                                                                                
79  Judy Fudge has argued, drawing on Nancy Fraser’s distinction between recognition 
claims and redistributive claims, that Charter equality rights foster recognition claims and 
recognition remedies but are “not very amenable to claims that either challenge pervasive 
social and legal norms or involve redistribution”. J. Fudge, “The Canadian Charter of Rights: 
Recognition, Redistribution, and the Imperialism of the Courts”, in T. Campbell, K.D. Ewing 
and A. Tomkins eds., Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001) 336, at 343. 
80  See Greschner, supra, note 12; Martin, supra, note 11; Hogg, supra, note 10. 
81  See the test set out in Harksen v. Lane NO and Others (1997) 11 B.C.L.R. 1489 
(CC). 
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judges, particularly those of L’Heureux-Dubé J.82 Perhaps it is time to 
borrow back. The Court needs to reconsider the incisive critiques pre-
sented by L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Egan83 and by McLachlin J. (as she 
then was) in Miron84 of treating proof of irrelevance as a necessary 
component of a section 15 violation. 
Another way of accomplishing the same result would be to build a 
more demanding test for means/ends fit into the section 15 analysis, in a 
manner that would ease the current evidentiary burdens on claimants 
and demand more of the state than the presence of a rational basis. This 
might involve modifying the Law test in some respects, and in other 
respects it might involve a renewed emphasis on passages in Iacobucci 
J.’s opinion in Law that have been overshadowed by subsequent devel-
opments. The Court’s recent jurisprudence treats the correspondence 
factor, which has proven to be a similarly situated or relevance test 
dressed up in new linguistic garb, as the decisive factor in equality 
claims. The Court could reiterate that the presence of historical disad-
vantage is “the most compelling factor favouring a conclusion that dif-
ferential treatment imposed by legislation is truly discriminatory”.85 The 
Court could also explore Iacobucci J.’s suggestion in Law that “a more 
precise correspondence will likely be important where the individual or 
group which is excluded by the legislation is already disadvantaged or 
vulnerable within Canadian society”.86 A more demanding test of 
means/ends fit would be one that asked the state to demonstrate that it 
chose the least subordinating means of pursuing a compelling objective 
that is itself consistent with equality norms.  
If the Law test were revised along these lines, a more sensible divi-
sion of the burden of proof in section 15 cases would result. In cases 
where the claimant has established subordinating differential treatment 
of a disadvantaged individual or group, the government could avoid a 
                                                                                                                                
82  For overviews of the South African constitutional equality jurisprudence, see S. Jag-
wanth and C. Murray, “Ten Years of Transformation: How Has Gender Equality in South 
Africa Fared?” (2002) 14 C.J.W.L. 255; A. Sachs, “Equality Jurisprudence: The Origin of 
Doctrine in the South African Constitutional Court” (1999) 5 Review of Constitutional 
Studies 76; S. Cowen, “Can ‘Dignity’ Guide South Africa’s Equality Jurisprudence?” (2001) 
17 South African J. Human Rights 34. 
83  Supra, note 13. 
84  Id. 
85  Law, supra, note 3, at para. 63. 
86  Id., at para. 106. 
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finding that section 15 is violated in one of two ways. First, it could 
show that the differential treatment was a result of a carefully targeted 
program aimed at ameliorating the conditions of a more or equally dis-
advantaged group. Second, it could displace a presumption of discrimi-
nation where subordinating treatment of disadvantaged individuals or 
groups has been established by showing that it was pursuing a compel-
ling objective pursuant to the least subordinating means. In other words, 
the government, not the claimant, would have to demonstrate the nature 
and importance of its objective, and the government, not the claimant, 
would have to show that it considered alternative means but none prom-
ised a less burdensome impact on the claimant or the disadvantaged 
group s/he represents.  
It may be true, as Iacobucci J. stated in Law, that there should be 
“no principle or evidentiary presumption that differential treatment for 
historically disadvantaged persons is discriminatory”.87 However, such a 
presumption is appropriate if the differential treatment at issue further 
subordinates a disadvantaged individual or group by imposing a burden 
or denying a benefit, and the policy at issue is not a targeted program 
that ameliorates the condition of a more or equally disadvantaged group. 
Without taking some steps along these lines, the Court’s stated com-
mitment to substantive equality is at risk of receding even further from 
its jurisprudential grasp. 
                                                                                                                                
87  Id., at para. 67. 
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VI. APPENDIX A 
Summary of Supreme Court of Canada Dispositions of Section 15 
Claims 
Listed below are all Supreme Court of Canada cases where a section 
15 claim was addressed by a majority of the Court. Companion cases 
that involved challenges to the same or similar legal provisions and 
raised the same section 15 issues have been grouped together and 
counted as one case. 
Key 
Ground = ground of discrimination asserted 
Section 15 violated? = whether a majority or plurality found a violation 
of section 15, and, if not, at which stage of the section 15 analysis the 
claim failed (1st = because no difference in treatment found; 2nd = 
because the difference in treatment was found not to be on the basis of a 
prohibited ground; 3rd = because the difference in treatment on a pro-
hibited ground was found not to be discrimination in a substantive 
sense; other = section 15 held to be inapplicable). 
Section 1 limit? = whether violation of section 15 upheld pursuant to 
section 1. 
Result = whether an unjustifiable violation of section 15 found. 
 
Case Ground  Section  15 violated? Section 1 limit? Result 
1.  Andrews 
(1989)88 
Citizenship Yes No Yes 
2. Workers’ 




No (2nd) N/A No 




No (2nd) N/A No 
                                                                                                                                
88  Supra, note 1. 
89  [1989] 2 S.C.R. 922. 
90  Supra, note 6. 
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4.  R. v. S. (S.) 
    (1990)91 
    R. v. S. (G.) 
(1990)92 
    R. v. P. (J.) 
(1990)93 
    R. v. T. (A.) 
(1990)94 




No (3rd) N/A No 
5.  R. v. Hess 
    (1990)96 
Sex No (3rd) N/A No 







Age Yes Yes No 
7. Rudolph 
Wolff (1990)100 
 Dywidag  
(1990)101 
Group seeking 
relief from the 
federal crown  




Age Yes No Yes 





No (2nd) N/A No 
                                                                                                                                
91  [1990] 2 S.C.R. 254, [1990] S.C.J. No. 66. 
92  [1990] 2 S.C.R. 294, [1990] S.C.J. No. 68. 
93  [1990] 2 S.C.R. 300, [1990] S.C.J. No. 67. 
94  [1990] 2 S.C.R. 304, [1990] S.C.J. No. 69. 
95  [1990] 2 S.C.R. 307, [1990] S.C.J. No. 70. 
96  [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906, [1990] S.C.J. No. 91. 
97  McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, [1990] S.C.J. No. 122. 
98  Harrison v. University of British Columbia, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 451, [1990] S.C.J. No. 
123. 
99  Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483, [1990] S.C.J. No. 125. 
100  Rudolph Wolff & Co. v. Canada, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 695, [1990] S.C.J. No. 28. 
101  Dywidag Systems International, Canada Ltd. v. Zutphen Brothers Construction Ltd., 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 705, [1990] S.C.J. No. 27. 
102  Tétreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), [1991] 2 
S.C.R. 22, [1991] S.C.J. No. 41. 
103  [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, [1992] S.C.J. No. 10. 
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10. Schachter      
(1992)104 










Not decided Yes No 
13. Symes 
(1993)107 
Sex No (1st) N/A No 
14.  Weatherall 
(1993)108 
Sex No (3rd) Even if did, yes 
justified 
No 




No (2nd) N/A No 
16.  NWAC 
(1994)110 
Sex No (other) 
 
N/A No 
17.  Finta 
(1994)111 
Group of persons 
who commit war 
crimes/or crimes 
against humanity 
No (2nd) N/A No 
18.  Miron 
(1995)112 
Marital status Yes  No Yes 








Family status & 
sex 
No (1st) N/A No 
                                                                                                                                
104  Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68. 
105  Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 
711, [1992] S.C.J. No. 27. 
106  Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, [1993] 
S.C.J. No. 94. 
107  Supra, note 76. 
108   Supra, note 31. 
109  Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995, [1993] S.C.J. No. 84. 
110  Native Women’s Association of Canada v. Canada, [1994], 3 S.C.R. 627, [1994] 
S.C.J. No. 93. 
111  R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, [1994] S.C.J. No. 26. 
112  Supra, note 13. 
113  Supra, note 13. 
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21.  Ont. Home 
Bldr’s Assoc. 
(1996)115 
Religion No (other) N/A No 
22.  Adler 
(1996)116 
Religion No (other) N/A No 




No (3rd) N/A No 
24.  Benner 
(1997)118 
Sex Yes No Yes 




Yes No Yes 




Yes No Yes 
27.  Van. 






tional or ethnic 
origin 
No (1st) N/A No 
28. Law 
(1999)122 
Age No (3rd) N/A No 
29.  M. v. H.  
      (1999)123 
Sexual  
orientation 
Yes No Yes 




Yes No Yes 
                                                                                                                                
114  Supra, note 77. 
115  Ontario Home Builders’ Association v. York Region Board of Education, [1996] 2 
S.C.R. 929, [1996] S.C.J. No. 80. 
116  Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609, [1996] S.C.J. No. 110. 
117  Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education,, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241, [1997] S.C.J. No. 98. 
118  Supra, note 37. 
119  Supra, note 7. 
120  Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29. 
121  Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. M.N.R., [1999] 1 
S.C.R. 10, [1999] S.C.J. No. 5. 
122  Supra, note 3. 
123  Supra, note 45. 
124  Supra, note 46. 
134  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
 







Mental disability No (3rd) N/A No 





















Yes No Yes 
36. Lavoie 
(2002)133 
Citizenship Yes Yes No 
37. Gosselin 
(2002)134 
Age No (3rd) N/A No 
38. Nova Scotia 
v. Walsh 
(2002)135 
Marital status No (3rd) N/A No 





No (2nd) N/A No 
                                                                                                                                
125  Supra, note 37. 
126  Orlowski v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 733, 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 33. 
127  Bese v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 722, 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 32. 
128  R. v. Lepage, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 744, [1999] S.C.J. No. 34. 
129  Supra, note 48. 
130  Supra, note 8. 
131  Supra, note 50. 
132  Supra, note 51. 
133  Supra, note 52. 
134  Supra, note 53. 
135  Supra, note 54. 
136  Supra, note 55. 
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40. Trociuk v. 
B.C. (2003)137 
Sex Yes No Yes 






Yes No Yes 
42. R. v. 
Malmo-Levine 
(2003)139 
Marijuana use No (2nd) N/A No 
43. Canadian 
Foundation for 
Children, Youth  
and the Law v. 
Canada 
(2004)140 
Age No (3rd) N/A No 
 
                                                                                                                                
137  Supra, note 56. 
138  Supra, note 57. 
139  Supra, note 43. 
140  Supra, note 58. 
136  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
 
VII. APPENDIX B 
Annual Success Rate in SCC Section 15 Cases 
 
Year Number of Cases Number of Wins Success Rate 
1989 3 1 33.3% 
1990 4 0 0% 
1991 1 1 100% 
1992 3 1 33.3% 
1993 4 0 0% 
1994 2 0 0% 
1995 3 1 33.3% 
1996 2 0 0% 
1997 3 2 66.6% 
1998 1 1 100% 
1999 6 2 33.3% 
2000 3 1 33.3% 
2001 0 0 - 
2002 3 0 0% 
2003 4 2 50% 
2004 1 0 0% 
Total 43 12 27.9% 
 
 
